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RESPONSE TO ALLEN AND ROSENBERG
CAROL S. STEIKER*
I find much of interest in Ron  Allen and  Ross  Rosenberg's
paper  on  the  Fourth  Amendment-much  that  is  thought-
provoking, and much that is convincing.  Indeed, I am in agree-
ment with three of the major points that they make, only to find
myself disagreeing with their ultimate conclusion.  My reaction
to their paper reminds  me of the  old story  about the biological
researcher and the frog:
A  biological  researcher  was  experimenting  on  a  frog  which
would jump whenever he  clapped his hands and  said, "Jump!"
The researcher cut off one  of the frog's legs, clapped his hands
and said  jump"--the frog jumped.  The researcher wrote in his
notebook, "Cut off one leg, frog still jumps."  The researcher cut
off a second  leg, clapped his hands  and said  jump'"-the frog
jumped.  He wrote in his notebook, "Cut off second leg, frog still
jumps."  The researcher  cut off a third leg, clapped his hands
and said  jump--the  frog jumped.  He wrote  in his  notebook,
"Cut off third leg, frog still jumps."  The researcher cut off the
fourth leg, clapped his hands and said  jump"-the frog just sat
there.  The  researcher  clapped  his  hands  harder  and  said
"Jump!'--the frog did not move.  He  clapped his hands  even
harder and shouted "JUMP!!"  Still no reaction.  He wrote in his
notebook, "Cut off fourth leg, frog goes deaf."
I do not mean to suggest that anything in Allen and Rosen-
berg's analysis suffers from the obvious defects of the medical re-
searcher's  conclusion, but I do mean  to say that I find many  of
the individual points that they make more persuasive than their
ultimate  conclusion,  which I would question,  or at least  moder-
ate.  Let me elaborate,  beginning with the three  "legs" of Allen
and Rosenberg's analysis with which I agree.
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I thank St. John's Law Review and St.
John's University School of Law for organizing such an interesting and dynamic con-
ference on a topic that still has the capacity to generate light as well as heat thirty
years later.
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First, I agree in large part with Allen  and Rosenberg's  cri-
tiques of the work Tony Amsterdam'  and Akhil Amar,2  and with
both their praise for and reservations about Bill Stuntz's3  work.
Amsterdam's  incredibly eloquent and justly famous Perspectives
on the Fourth  Amendment4  is flawed by his single-minded  focus
on the problem of police discretion to the virtual dismissal  of the
role  of text  and  history in constitutional  interpretation.  Allen
and  Rosenberg  are correct;  any convincing theory of the  Fourth
Amendment  must  include  a  theory  of the role  of the  Constitu-
tion's  text  and history.  Amar's  thought-provoking  and  widely
read  work is  undermined,  as  I have  argued  elsewhere,5  by too
much emphasis on text and history, and by his virtual dismissal
of the role of modern police forces,  and the problem of racial  dis-
crimination in law enforcement.6  I also agree with Allen and Ro-
senberg that Bill Stuntz's important work,  especially his recent
essay on the relationship between  criminal procedure  and crimi-
nal justice,'  is ground-breaking  in its understanding of the rea-
sons  for the  failure  of constitutional  criminal  procedure.  Fur-
thermore,  I  agree  that  Stuntz's  proposals  for  reform  are  less
convincing than his diagnosis of the problem, but not for the rea-
sons advanced by Allen and Rosenberg.
Allen and  Rosenberg think that Stuntz's  proposals  (judicial
regulation of substantive criminal law, criminal justice funding,
and police coercion under the Constitution) are unconvincing, not
so much on their own terms, but because  they represent "a gen-
eral  theoretical  solution  to  the  problem  of the Fourth  Amend-
ment."8  Indeed, Allen and Rosenberg argue that the weakness of
' Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
2  Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
3 Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School.
4 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives  on the Fourth  Amendment,  58  MINN.  L.
REV.  349 (1974).
5 See Carol  S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107  HARV.  L.
REV.  820,  824  (1994)  (responding  to Akhil  Reed  Amar,  Fourth Amendment First
Principles,  107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994)).
6  See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth  Amendment First  Principles,  107 HARV.  L. REV.
757, 759 (1994)  ("We need to read the [Fourth]  Amendment's words and take them
seriously:  They  do not  require warrants,  probable  cause,  or  exclusion  of evidence,
but they do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable.").
7 See William  J. Stuntz, The  Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal  Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1,  6 (1997) (suggesting that the reasons for the
failure  of constitutional criminal procedure  lie in the necessary allocation of power
between courts and legislatures).
8 Ronald J.  Allen & Ross Rosenberg, The Fourth  Amendment And The Limits Of
[Vol. 72:1203 1204
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Stuntz's prescriptions  and the much greater  weaknesses  of Am-
sterdam's  and  Amar's  theories  of the  Fourth Amendment  are
proof that "top-down" theories  always  fail.9  This  is where  my
view diverges  from that of Allen  and Rosenberg.  While I  agree
with their sharp-eyed  identification  of weaknesses  in the  theo-
ries of the authors they discuss, I believe that these failings are
simply proof that there are some flawed top-down theories.  Top-
down theorists have to be  careful  about the risk of solipsism-
believing that the things that they see best are the only things
there are to  see; they must be careful  to have theories that are
not too reductionist or context-insensitive.  However, the identi-
fication  of weaknesses  in  some  theories  is  hardly  proof that
theorizing is a pointless exercise.
Second, I agree with Allen and Rosenberg that Hayek's dis-
tinction between  "made" and "grown" systems is fascinating and
useful.1 0  We should be wary of anyone who tells us that we can
restructure all of criminal procedure (or many other areas of law)
by theorizing about it without doing damage to certain important
features of the system as a grown system.  I would use Allen and
Rosenberg's  insight  about  grown  systems  to  add  to  their  cri-
tiques of Fourth Amendment theorists  like Amsterdam, and es-
pecially Amar, by noting that none  of these theorists  has devel-
oped  an  adequate  (or  really  any)  theory  of  precedent.  This
failure  is  truly  debilitating  for  Fourth  Amendment  law  as  a
"system," because  it  is precisely by the mechanism  of precedent
that the system "grows" in Hayek's sense.
Third,  and  finally,  I  agree with  Allen  and  Rosenberg  that
"[t]he  model to apply to the Fourth Amendment is the model  of
the common law, with its capacity to adjust to quite fine distinc-
tions.""  Fourth Amendment law has grown very much like the
common  law,  changing with  minute  modifications  in  the enor-
mous  range  of factual  scenarios  that give  rise  to  challenges  to
"search and seizure" by state actors.  I agree with Allen and Ro-
senberg that this course of growth is both inevitable and salubri-
ous, given the Fourth Amendment's unelaborated proscription of
Theory: Local vs. General  Theoretical  Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1149.
9  See id. '0 See id. (citing F.A.  HAYEK,  LAW,  LEGISLATION,  LIBERTY:  RULES  AND  ORDER
35-54 (1973)  (explaining that a "made" order originates from the design of its crea-
tor, whereas a "grown" order arises without a plan)).
11  Id.
1998] 1205
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searches  and  seizures that are "unreasonable."  This  concept  is
so general  and therefore  so  context-specific,  that it  requires the
kind of slow and  careful  elucidation  over time that has charac-
terized  Fourth Amendment  law  in the  United  States  Supreme
Court and other federal and state courts.
Despite  these three  important  areas  of agreement,  I none-
theless  question  Allen  and  Rosenberg's  ultimate  conclusion-
their  deep  skepticism  about  theory  and  their  call  for  "local
knowledge" in its stead.
12  In part, I question the  evidence they
marshal  to  support  their  skepticism.  Furthermore,  in  larger
part, I question the  capacity of the idea of "local knowledge"  to
explain  how Fourth Amendment  law has  grown  in the  past  or
how it should grow in the future.
First, consider  the  evidence  Allen  and  Rosenberg  offer  to
convince  us  to  join  in  their  skepticism  of Fourth  Amendment
theory.  Allen  and Rosenberg  initially point to the cacophony  of
scholarly prescriptions  for Fourth Amendment law  as proof that
the Fourth Amendment  is  not susceptible  to  theory generally." 3
In their words:
Each  author..,  praises  some  aspects  of other  scholars'
work and some of the cases, criticizes  much of the schol-
arship and many of the cases, and adds something unique
to the conversation....  That the air remains filled with
the  contending  voices  is  strong  evidence  of part  of our
thesis, in  particular  that no  unifying,  true theory of the
fourth amendment exists to be found."
The mere  fact, however, that there is widespread  disagree-
ment among scholars as to Fourth Amendment prescriptions  (or
anything else, for that matter) is hardly proof that general  theo-
rizing  is  useless  or  that there  is  no  "truth" here  that can  be
sought.  The concept of "academic  disagreement" is the very op-
posite  of an  oxymoron;  such  disagreement  is  inevitable  in  all
scholarly  disciplines-it  is  the  academic  full-employment  plan!
Serious  scholarly  disagreement,  even  about  first principles,  is
proof of nothing more than that we are in "academic land."
Allen  and Rosenberg  go  on  to claim  that "local  knowledge"
about  the  Fourth  Amendment  is  so  complete  that there  is  no
12 See id.
"  See id.
14 Id.
[Vol.  72:1203 1206
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"robust set of issues in need  of clarification" 15  and, therefore, no
need  for general  theorizing.  I  disagree, not with the inference
that they draw from this observation,  but with the observation
itself  as  a  factual  characterization  of  the  world  of  Fourth
Amendment law.  In contrast to Allen and Rosenberg, I find that
a laundry list of "robust" and unresolved Fourth Amendment is-
sues leaps to mind immediately.  Such  a list is indispensable  to
any law professor  who  uses,  as many  law  professors  do,  ques-
tions of the "issue spotter" variety on law school exams.  The fact
that I (and all of the other  criminal procedure professors that I
know) can come up with new "issue spotters" that are genuinely
difficult and that generate a diversity of opinion among our stu-
dents, year  after year,  suggests that Allen  and  Rosenberg  are
simply wrong when they claim that Fourth Amendment law "is
close  to  a model  of clarity." 16  Any laundry  list of such issues
would include:
* What is, and should be, the role of race (or ethnicity) as a
factor  in  creating  reasonable  suspicion  or  probable  cause,
whether  as  a part  of a  criminal  "profile" or  on its own?  This
vexing  question has  divided  courts  and commentators,  and re-
mains an important subject in contemporary judicial, academic,
and public debate. 7
* Will we, and should we, expand the currently narrow "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule8 into a more generalized
"good faith" exception for reasonable, yet erroneous,  police judg-
ments outside of the warrant context?  Not long ago, the United
States asked the Supreme Court to decide this issue," 9  and mem-
bers  of Congress  have proposed it  as  a legislative  "solution" to
the costs of the judicially enforced exclusionary rule. °  Any such
15  Id.
16  Id.
17  For  example,  an  entire  chapter  of Randall  Kennedy's  recent  and  powerful
book  on  racial  issues  in  the  criminal justice  system  deals  with  this  issue,  and
chronicles  the debate  among judges  and  others.  See  RANDALL  KENNEDY,  RACE,
CRIME,  AND THE LAW 136-67 (1997).
'8 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.  897, 926  (1984) (holding that the exclu-
sionary rule should not apply to a search made in good faith reliance  on a warrant
that was, in the eyes of reviewing courts, unsupported by probable cause).
'9  See Arizona  v. Evans,  514  U.S.  1,  16 n.5  (1995)  (noting the request  of the
United States as amicus curiae but declining to decide the question).
20  See Kenneth Jost, Exclusionary  Rule Reforms Advance, A.B.A. J., May 1995,
at 18 (describing House bill that would expand the current good faith exception  to
searches conducted without a warrant). The Bill was passed by the House of Repre-
19981 1207
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change  would  not  merely  create  one  more  exception  to the  op-
eration of the exclusionary rule, but would likely reset the stan-
dard of Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" as well.2'
o What is, and should be, the scope  of searches that are not
based  on  suspicion,  such  as  regimes  of  random  drug-testing?
Our  "local  knowledge" tells  us that  such  testing is  reasonable,
under  certain  circumstances,  for  railway  employees, 22  customs
officials,"  and high school athletes, 24 but not for state public offi-
cials.'  What about the rest of us?  What  about other forms  of
searches that are not based on suspicion, such as the creation  of
fingerprint or DNA data banks?  The scope of the "special needs"
exception to ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements is a huge
area  of speculation  and  contention  in state  and  federal  courts
and among academics.26
o What uses by law enforcement agents should courts permit
of technological  enhancement-not just thermal imaging, which
Allen and  Rosenberg  acknowledge  as  unresolved, 2 7  but the gen-
eral  use  of  high-powered  cameras,  binoculars,  microphones,
videotapes, etc.?  As technology advances with startling rapidity,
sentatives, but never left the Senate Judiciary Committee.
21 As I stated in a more detailed discussion:
Leon  may do more  than establish its  already significant good-faith  excep-
tion for reliance  on judicial warrants; broadly construed, it may end up  re-
setting the standard to which law  enforcement agents will be held in their
conduct by enforcing through evidentiary  exclusion not the current Fourth
Amendment  norms,  but  rather  a  "reasonable"  approximation  of those
norms.
Carol  S.  Steiker,  Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2514-15 (1996).
"See  Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'  Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,  632-33  (1989)
(finding that drug and  alcohol  tests serve  a legitimate  safety interest, and  do  not
unreasonably  infringe upon covered  employees' privacy  even when there  is no sus-
picion of impairment).
"See  National  Treasury  Employees  Union  v.  Von  Raab,  489  U.S.  656,  677
(1989)  (holding that testing  of customs  employees  who  deal with  illegal  drugs  or
carryr weapons while on duty does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
See  Vernonia  School  Dist.  47J  v.  Acton,  515  U.S.  646,  664-65  (1995)
(concluding that drug-testing of student athletes  is constitutional because  it deters
drug use among a particularly susceptible group and is not particularly invasive).
See Chandler v. Miller,  117  S.  Ct.  1295,  1298 (1997)  (holding that "Georgia's
requirement that candidates  for state office pass a drug test ...  does  not fit within
the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches").
26 See  Carol  S.  Steiker,  The  Limits of the Preventive States, J.  CRIM.  L.  &
CRIMINOLOGY  (forthcoming  summer  1998)  (discussing the unsettled  scope  of the
"special need" exception).
27 See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 8.
1208 [Vol.  72:1203
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the possibility for enormous encroachments  on personal privacy
grows with similar speed.  The courts have not come close to cre-
ating a body of sensible and predictable "local knowledge" in this
area as it  already exists, much less a way of dealing with future
developments.28
But even if local knowledge proliferated in these areas, too, I
would still question Allen and Rosenberg's  conclusion.  Even the
most comprehensive  development of "local knowledge" could not
suffice as a Fourth Amendment system that either describes cur-
rent law  or  adequately  prescribes  future  developments.  Allen
and Rosenberg's call for local knowledge ultimately fails because
the  common  law  and  constitutional  criminal  procedure,  while
they may share many of the non-top-down  attributes  of "grown"
as opposed to "made" systems, differ in one crucial respect.  The
common law and constitutional criminal procedure are not like a
rain-forest  or  a spontaneously  developed  city like  15th-century
Bruges, in that these bodies of law tend to grow by a distinctive
cognitive process  of decision-makers called analogy or analogical
reasoning.  As  my colleague,  philosopher  Scott Brewer, has re-
cently demonstrated,  analogical reasoning requires the reasoner
to posit a higher-level theory to explain why it  is that two situa-
tions  are  analogous. 29  To  give  an example  that leaps  out from
Allen  and  Rosenberg's  own  description  of Fourth  Amendment
"local knowledge," we know a lot about Fourth Amendment rules
regarding  houses  and  cars.  You  need  a warrant  to  search  a
house; you do not need a warrant to search a car.  Inevitably, the
question  will come  up,  what about  a motor home?  Whether  a
motor home is more like a house or more like a car  depends on
whether  the reason that you need a warrant  to search  a house
but not a car is, on the one hand, the special privacy of dwellings
or,  on the other hand, the  exigent  mobility of cars. 0  It  is  pre-
28  See,  e.g.,  Robert  C.  Power,  Technology and the Fourth  Amendment: A  Pro-
posed Formulation  for Visual Searches, 80  J.  CRIM.  L. & CRIMINOLOGY  1,  4 (1989)
(noting that the  Supreme  Court's  pronouncements  on  technological  enhancement
and the Fourth Amendment  "have resulted in a crazy melange of rules  and princi-
ples").
2See  generally Scott Brewer,  Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics,
and the Rational  Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996)
(explaining the structure of legal reasoning by analogy).
3O  See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1985) (determining that a mo-
tor home does fit into the vehicle exception to search warrant requirements because
it is mobile and subject to regulations not applicable to actual homes).
1998] 1209
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cisely these reasons that Fourth Amendment law is lamentably
short on,  as Allen and Rosenberg themselves  acknowledge.3'  An
enormous  amount of Fourth Amendment  law depends  on  anal-
ogy.  Is a frisk of a car3  or of a house 3 "like" a Terry frisk of a
person?  Is "plain feel" "like" "plain view"?3 4  Is a sobriety check-
point33  more like a random stop for identification (prohibited) 38 or
a random drug test of a railroad employee (permitted)?
3 7
The  centrality  of  analogy  as  the  primary  engine  in  the
growth  of both  Fourth  Amendment  law  and  the  common  law
generally  suggests  that a certain  amount  of theory  is  not  only
desirable, but absolutely necessary in Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence.  This is not to say that a single, over-arching theory is
necessary, or even  helpful.  In this respect,  I am  in agreement
with Allen  and  Rosenberg,  and  would  suggest  that  Cass  Sun-
stein's  idea of "incompletely  theorized  agreements"  as  key to  a
healthy judiciary can  be of significant  help here. 8  To  a certain
degree Sunstein shares Allen  and Rosenberg's  skepticism  about
the possibility  and usefulness  of "high-level" or "top-down" the-
ory for judges  deciding  cases.3 9  Instead  of rejecting theory alto-
3'  See Allen & Rosenberg, supra  note 9 ("When the question mutates from 'what'
are the demands  of the fourth amendment with regard to houses to 'why' they are
what they are,  ambiguity  sets in. Again,  most of the  'what'  questions  [regarding
cars] have clear answers. 'Why' questions considerably less so.").
32 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,  1049  (1983)  (holding that a warrantless
search of the areas of a car where weapons may be concealed  is constitutional, pro-
vided that the  police officer reasonably believes  that the suspect is dangerous and
could gain control of the weapon).
See Maryland v. Buie,  494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (authorizing protective sweeps
of homes in order to protect officers executing an arrest).
34  See  Minnesota  v.  Dickerson,  508 U.S.  366,  374-75  (1993)  (noting that the
plain-view  doctrine  is  analogous  to  a  situation  in  which  illegal  drugs  are  found
"through the sense of touch during an otherwise lawful search").
's See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496  U.S. 444, 447  (1990) (holding
that highway sobriety checkpoints are constitutional).
36  See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (determining that it is unconstitu-
tional for a police officer to stop an individual and request identification if he does
not have a reasonable belief that the individual is engaged in illegal activity).
17  See  Skinner  v. Railway  Labor  Executives'  Ass'n,  489  U.S.  602,  633  (1989)
(concluding that drug-testing is constitutional because the government's  interest in
safety outweighs the railroad employees' interest in privacy).
3 See  generally  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Incompletely  Theorized Agreements,  108
HARV.  L. REV.  1733 (1995) (describing an "incompletely theorized agreement" as an
agreement  on a particular issue without agreement  on the underlying fundamental
principle, and suggesting that such a strategy can produce consensus in a pluralistic
democracy).
39  See id. at 1752-53 (suggesting that use of large-scale theories by judges can be
1210
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gether, however,  Sunstein urges that judges "adopt a presump-
tion ...  against  high-level  theorization"  and  attempt  to  decide
cases at a lower theoretical level. °  In doing so, judges will pro-
duce  mid-level  rules  and  principles  that  have  the  capacity  to
generate more widespread agreement, both within the judiciary,
and within our pluralistic democracy.41  I believe that Sunstein's
insight  could  be  applied  profitably  to Fourth Amendment  law:
What we need is a proliferation of mid-level theories, which may
or may not be ultimately  amenable  to complete  rationalization
with  each other.  Therefore,  I  end up somewhere  between  top-
down  theory and what I take to be Allen  and  Rosenberg's  anti-
theoretical concept of "local knowledge."
It might turn out, of course, that what Allen and Rosenberg
really  mean  by  "local  knowledge"  is  mid-level  theory,  or  they
might accept this idea as a friendly amendment to their current
views.  If so, I may have to either change my opening anecdote or
frankly  acknowledge that maybe frogs  do go deaf when you cut
off all of their legs.
problematic, and urging a more modest approach).
40 Id. at 1767.
41 See id. at 1771.
1998] 1211
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